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Sports Video Games and Student Athletes:
An Analysis of Publicity Rights and First Amendment Concerns
Kirsten O’Donnell

I. Introduction
Over the past several years, multiple suits have been brought against Electronic Arts, Inc.
(EA) by current and former National Collegiate Athletic Association (the NCAA) student
athletes (student athletes). The student athletes allege, among other claims, that EA publishes
video games which feature the images of student athletes, in violation of their publicity rights.1
In response, EA has claimed its video games are protected under the First Amendment, and that
their First Amendment interests trump the publicity rights of the student athletes.2
The use of student-athlete images in EA video games has been examined extensively in
the academic world. Many of these publications are primarily focused on discussing the inherent
unfairness of the NCAA bylaws, specifically the amateurism clauses.3 These clauses prevent
student athletes from receiving any compensation in connection with their athletic performance,
but do not prevent the NCAA from receiving hundreds of millions of dollars per year through
media and licensing agreements.4 In addition, third parties, such as EA, receive a huge economic
benefit from licensing intellectual property from the NCAA for use in its products.5
These publications raise possible solutions to address this inequity, such as repealing
amateurism clauses in the NCAA bylaws; 6 compensating student athletes through universityprovided salaries or trusts, 7 allowing student athletes to contract with and be paid by third
parties or requiring student athletes to license their image to the NCAA, which, although an
expansion of the NCAA’s rights, would result in the NCAA lawfully acquiring the rights to
student athletes’ images.8
1

This paper will argue, as many of the articles mentioned above, that student athletes have
publicity rights and that EA, specifically through its NCAA Football games (NCAA Football),
violates those rights. In contrast to the above publications, however, this article will not propose
solutions to address the inequity between student athletes and the NCAA. Rather, this paper will
argue that EA’s First Amendment rights should not outweigh the publicity rights of student
athletes, and discuss how courts should analyze First Amendment defenses raised in right of
publicity cases, specifically highlighting the First Amendment raised in right of publicity cases
through an analysis of the First Amendment defense argued in Hart v. Electronic Arts, Inc.
To begin, this paper will provide a background of the NCAA’s history, bylaws and
licensing.

Next, the paper will examine the right of publicity, demonstrating how student

athletes possess publicity rights and how EA violated those rights. The paper will then analyze
the First Amendment defense raised by EA in Hart and discuss how the Hart court misapplied
the transformative use test in upholding EA’s defense. Finally, this paper will address the
potential subsequent impact of this decision, and discuss how courts should analyze First
Amendment defenses in right of publicity cases.
II. The NCAA, The Players and The Game
A. The NCAA and Student Athletes
Following a rash of serious injuries and some deaths in the 1905 football season,9 thenPresident Theodore Roosevelt lead the charge to reform football.10 This push to reform resulted
in 62 colleges and universities banding together in 1906 to form the Intercollegiate Athletic
Association of the United States (IAAUS).11 In 1910, the IIAUS was renamed the National
Collegiate Athletic Association.12
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The NCAA originally operated solely as a discussion group and rules-making body, until
the first NCAA National Championship in 1921.13 More national championships followed the
initial National Collegiate Track and Field Championship, and the group eventually grew to
resemble the complex structure of the present-day NCAA.14
Today, the NCAA’s stated purpose is to protect student-athletes with increased emphasis
on athletics and academic excellence. 15

To support these goals, the NCAA adopted an

amateurism provision in its bylaws, purportedly to ensure athletes are: 1.) “motivated by
education and by the physical, mental and social benefits” of participating in the sport, and 2.)
“protected from exploitation by professional commercial enterprises.”16
The NCAA bylaws prohibit student athletes from being compensated.17 Specifically,
section 12.1.2 of the NCAA bylaws prohibits a student athlete from any of the following: using
their athletic skill for pay, accepting a promise of pay, signing a contract to commit to a
professional athletic team, or receiving salary or other financial assistance based on athletic skill
or participation.18 If a student athlete violates any provision of section 12.1.2 of the NCAA
bylaws, he or she loses amateur status, and becomes ineligible for competing in the sport related
to the violation.19 Because of the amateurism clause in the NCAA bylaws, student athletes are
prohibited from receiving any money for playing a sport professionally, endorsing any products
or services, signing memorabilia in the off-season, or licensing their names, images or
likenesses. 20
The NCAA bylaws also require student athletes to sign certain forms in order to be
eligible to participate in a collegiate athletic program. 21 One of those forms, Form 11-3a,
required by NCAA bylaw 12.5,22 “authorize[s] the NCAA (or a third party acting on behalf of
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the NCAA . . .) to use [the student athlete’s] name or picture . . . to generally promote NCAA
championships or other NCAA events, activities or programs.”23
B. NCAA Licensing
Under the NCAA bylaws, student athletes are not allowed to receive compensation for
their athletic abilities; however, the NCAA does receive compensation, mainly through
licensing.24 The NCAA has a long-term agreement with IMG College to administer the domestic
and international licensing programs for the NCAA.25 The Collegiate Licensing Company
(CLC), a subsidiary of IMG College, manages the daily administration of the NCAA licensing
program.26
The NCAA licensing agreements are extremely lucrative. For example, media
agreements are a significant source of revenue for the NCAA, constituting 86 percent of the
NCAA’s revenue in 2009-2010.27 In 2010, the NCAA entered into a 14-year agreement with
CBS and Turner Broadcasting System for $10.8 billion, or about $771 million annually.28
In 2005, EA entered into an exclusive 6-year license with CLC for the NCAA’s
intellectual property.29 This license made EA the top non-apparel licensee of the NCAA,30 and
provided EA the exclusive right to use league logos, teams, stadiums and uniforms for use in its
EA Games.31 The license does not provide EA any right to use the names, images or likenesses
of NCAA student-athletes; however, it is widely recognized that the virtual players in EA games
are clearly intended to represent NCAA student athletes.32
III. Right of Publicity
A. History and Development
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The right of publicity has its roots in the right to privacy,33 and its evolution can be traced
through several publications and key judicial decisions in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
century.
In Thomas Cooley’s 1888 publication A Treatise on the Law of Torts or the Wrongs
Which Arise Independent of Contract (Cooley on Torts), Cooley inferred the right to be let alone
from a series of court decisions regarding contracts, personal property and defamation.34
Public perceptions that the press had overstepped the bounds of decency and the advent
of new technology motivated Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis to write about the right
to privacy.35 In their 1890 publication The Right of Privacy, Warren and Brandeis supported
Cooley’s right to be let alone, and classified this right as a subset of the right to life.36
In 1953, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit coined the term “right
of publicity”37 in Haelan Laboratories v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc.38
In Haelan, major league baseball players assigned exclusive rights to their photographs to
the plaintiff for use in promoting the plaintiff’s product. 39 The complaint asserted that the
defendant induced the players to assign the same rights while the players were still under
contract with the plaintiff. 40 The Haelan court rejected the defendant’s claims that: 1.) the
contract was a release of the players’ right of privacy and 2.) such right was not an assignable
property right, stating:
[I]n addition to and independent of that right of privacy, . . . a man has a right in
the publicity value of his photograph, i.e., the right to grant the exclusive privilege
of publishing his picture. . . This might be called a “right of publicity.” For it is
common knowledge that many prominent persons (especially actors and ballplayers), far from having their feelings bruised through public exposure of their
likenesses, would feel sorely deprived if they no longer received money for
authorizing advertisements, popularizing their countenances, displayed in
newspapers, magazines, busses, trains and subways. This right of publicity would
usually yield them no money unless it could be made the subject of an exclusive
grant which barred any other advertiser from using their pictures.41
5

This decision clarified and distinguished publicity from the right of privacy, and
articulated the right as a property right, one that could be assigned, and used to recover
damages from a defendant who used a plaintiff’s name or likeness without
authorization.42
Shortly after Haelan, Professor Melville Nimmer’s 1954 article The Right of Publicity
sought to clarify and define the parameters of the right. 43 In agreement with the holding in
Haelan, Nimmer stated that celebrity status did not constitute a waiver of publicity rights and
that such rights could be licensed or assigned. 44 Nimmer also stated that everyone, not just
celebrities, has a right of publicity,45 and provided policy rationales to support that assertion.46
In particular, he argued that “the right of publicity . . . is the right of each person to control and
profit from the publicity values which he has created or purchased . . .,” and that “every person is
entitled to the fruit of his labors unless there are important countervailing public policy
considerations . . .”47
In 1967, William Prosser furthered the discussion on the right of Publicity in his
publication Privacy.

In this article, Prosser explained that the right of privacy as described in

The Right of Privacy should be viewed as being comprised of four distinct torts:
(i) Intrusion upon the plaintiff’s seclusion or solitude, or into his private affairs,
(ii) Public disclosure of embarrassing private facts about the plaintiff,
(iii)Publicity which places the plaintiff in a false light in the public eye, and
(iv) Appropriation, for the defendant’s advantage, of the plaintiff’s name or likeness.48
The first three torts proffered by Prosser clearly protect privacy interests of individuals. This
approach reflects the privacy concerns summarized in the The Right of Privacy.49 However, the
final tort, appropriation, provided individuals a right Nimmer described as the other side of the
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privacy coin. 50 Instead of protecting one’s right to privacy in personal affairs, appropriation
protected one’s ability to publicly exploit his or her name or likeness for commercial gain, and
prevented others from doing so without permission. 51 Prosser cited Haelan in support of
creating the tort of appropriation, and, echoing Nimmer, recognized it as a proprietary right that
could be transferred by selling licenses.52
In 1977, the right of publicity was formally recognized by the United States
Supreme Court in Zacchini v. Scripps Howard Broadcasting, the only right to publicity
case it has decided to date.53 Zacchini, a “human cannonball,” sued a news program for
televising his entire fifteen-second performance without his permission.54 In holding in
favor of Zacchini, the Court noted that the right of publicity not only ensures that
entertainers are compensated for their work, but also provides entertainers with an
“economic incentive . . . to make the investment required to produce a performance of
interest to the public.” 55 This statement echoes the policy justifications for federal
copyright and patent laws.56
B. Modern Right of Publicity
Today, the right of publicity is a matter of state law, 57 and is recognized by statute,
common law or a combination of both.58 Though the elements vary from state to state, the right
of publicity generally protects an individual’s property interest in his or her image. 59 While there
is no federal right of publicity, 60 federal law, specifically the Lanham Act, provides similar
protection by preventing unfair competition and misappropriation. 61 The Lanham Act provides
protection against any false or misleading descriptions or representations of fact likely to cause
confusion regarding a plaintiff’s endorsement of, or an affiliation, connection or association with
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the defendant’s product or service.62 As a result of providing for similar protection, suits which
raise right of publicity claims usually also raise claims under the Lanham Act.63
C. Violation of Right of Publicity
As noted above, the specific elements of the right of publicity vary by state. In states that
recognize publicity rights, however, courts generally consider the following elements to
determine if a person’s right of publicity has been violated:
(i) Use of the plaintiff’s identity

(ii) For the commercial advantage of the defendant

(iii)Without consent of the plaintiff

(iv) Resulting in injury to the plaintiff.64
1. Use of Plaintiff’s Identity
Courts rely on statutory definitions, case law, or both to determine “identity” in right of
publicity claims.
As statutes and controlling law vary from state to state, definitions of the basic elements
of a right to publicity claim also vary.65 For example, in California, one of the first states to
enact a right of publicity statute and a state in which many right of publicity cases have been
tried, “identity” includes the name, voice, signature, photograph or likeness of an individual,66
and the definition applies equally to deceased personalities.67 In contrast, the Indiana right of
publicity statute is much more expansive.68 Indiana defines identity, known as personality in the
statute, as the “name, voice, signature, photograph, image, likeness, distinctive appearance,
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gestures or mannerisms” 69 of a living or deceased natural person, and provides that such right is
descendible. 70 Indiana’s expansive rights are in sharp contrast with the statutory right of
publicity in New York, which narrowly defines “identity” as a living person’s name, portrait,
picture or voice.71
Courts have also relied on case law to shape the definition of “identity” under the right of
publicity. Courts have recognized “identity” to include a person’s name or likeness,72 distinctive
voice,73 and any drawing or other artistic rendering intended to represent a particular person,
whether or not the person’s name is actually used in connection with the depiction.74 Particularly
applicable to the suits brought against EA, courts have also determined that “identity” includes
electronic imitations of a person,75 animatronic reproductions of a person76 and virtual images of
persons in video games.77 No Doubt v. Activision Publishing, Inc78. is an example of the latter.
In No Doubt, the Court of Appeals of California recognized avatars of No Doubt band members
in the Activision game Band Hero as likenesses of the band members which could be licensed
for a commercial purpose.79 Similarly, in Kirby v. Sega of America, Inc., the Court of Appeals of
California determined that Kirby’s allegation that Sega used her identity to create a virtual
character in a Sega videogame presented a triable issue of fact.80
2. Use of Identity for a Commercial Advantage
Using the name or likeness of another for commercial gain constitutes use of identity for
a commercial advantage. 81 Traditional misappropriation is usually obvious, 82 and generally
refers to an individual’s name or likeness in advertising or marketing to state or imply
endorsement by the individual.83 Demonstrating use of identity for a commercial advantage is
not limited to a showing of false endorsement, however.84 In C.B.C. Distribution and Marketing,
Inc. v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media,85 the United States Court of Appeals for the
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Eighth Circuit held that CBC’s use of baseball players’ identities in its fantasy baseball products
satisfied the commercial advantage requirement, despite the identities not being used as an
advertisement or endorsement.86
3. Lack of Consent
As first noted in Haelan, the right of publicity includes the right for a person to license
his or her identity. 87 Use of one’s identity without valid consent through such a license
constitutes a violation of the right of publicity.88 Valid consent can be demonstrated through an
express or implied license or assignment.89 Conversely, a lack of consent can be inferred if a
defendant cannot demonstrate an express or implied license or assignment existed, or if the
defendant’s use is inconsistent with the terms of a license or assignment.90
4. Resulting injury
The final prong of a right of publicity claim requires the plaintiff to demonstrate an actual
economic harm. 91 This can be measured by calculating the value lost by the person whose
identity was misappropriated, or by calculating the economic value derived from the use of the
identity.92 Accordingly, if a plaintiff cannot demonstrate that his or her identity has commercial
value, no right of publicity violation exists because the plaintiff did not suffer any injury. 93
IV. Application of the Right of Publicity to Student Athletes
Applying the four-pronged analysis to student athletes, it is clear that EA’s use of student
athlete images in NCAA Football violated the student athletes’ right of publicity.
A. EA Used Student Athletes’ Identities in Its NCAA Football Game Series
As discussed above, “identity” in publicity rights cases has been held to include use by
another of virtual avatars that resemble a real person, as well as use by another of a person’s
name.94 EA used both in their NCAA Football game series.95
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Regarding the virtual avatar, it is important to note that since many college football
games are televised, the physical characteristics of players and their uniforms have become
associated with the student athletes on a national level.96 The virtual players in NCAA Football
are nearly identical to their real-life student athlete counterparts, mirroring their jersey number,
height, weight, skin color, hair color, playing style, handedness, performance statistics and
hometown.97 In addition, the virtual players in the NCAA Football are depicted wearing the
same accessories, such as visors, gloves and armbands that the student athletes favored while
playing.98 These facts alone sufficiently demonstrate that EA used student athletes’ identities.
In addition to mirroring the real-life players’ physical characteristics, EA also permits,
and arguably encourages, its customers to add the student athlete names to NCAA Football99.
Although the student athletes’ names do not appear in NCAA Football initially, EA programmed
its games to allow consumers to add or edit the names of the virtual players, and save the
modifications within the game.100 Furthermore, EA helped to facilitate the name-changing
process in later editions. Starting with NCAA Football 09, NCAA Football included a feature
called “Locker Room,” which allows consumers to easily upload current NCAA player rosters
into the game.101 Upon uploading the rosters, the names of the actual student athletes appear on
the jerseys of their virtual counterparts.102
In the event that a consumer remained unable to identify the virtual athlete with his reallife counterpart after the roster upload, EA programmed its virtual game announcers to identify
the virtual players by their names in game commentary.103 Prior to uploading player rosters or
manually entering player names, commentators refer to the virtual players by jersey number
only.104 After uploading a roster or manually entering a student athlete’s name, the game
commentators will refer to the virtual player by their name; however, the game commentators
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only recognize and announce the names which are programmed by EA into the game.105 For
example, when the name Ryan Perriloux was entered into the game, the virtual commentators
pronounced it correctly (as Perrillew); however, when “Perrillew” was entered into the game
manually, the commentator did not recognize or say the name.106 In addition, Brad Nessler, an
NCAA Football game commentator, admitted that these names are pre-recorded into the
games.107
The game features described above demonstrate that EA used student athletes’ images in
the NCAA Football games, and meet the first prong of the right of publicity analysis.
B. EA Used Student Athletes’ Identities for a Commercial Advantage
EA used the identities of student athletes for commercial gain. Inserting the student
athletes’ identities into its commercial product gave EA’s games a degree of realism, which is
the primary reason for the popularity and success of the EA Games.108 Additionally, one student
athlete claimed other “commerical use violations,” alleging that EA used his identity to
advertise, market and endorse NCAA Football.109 These additional claims are not required to
find that EA used the identities for a commercial gain.110 Perhaps most importantly, EA admits
that the revenue generated from its games is greatly enhanced by the use of intellectual property
licensed from third parties, such as the NCAA.111
C. EA Used Student Athletes’ Identities Without Consent
Use of another’s identity without permission of the person or entity that holds the rights
to the image constitutes lack of consent.112 The student athletes did not license images to EA; in
fact, they are prohibited from doing so under the NCAA bylaws.113 The Form 11-3a, which
student athletes are required to sign, provides the NCAA the right to use student athletes’
likenesses to promote NCAA championships, events, activities or programs.114 Though this
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includes a provision which allows NCAA to sublicense student athletes’ identities to third
parties,115 it cannot be said that EA’s NCAA Football games are NCAA championships, events,
activities or programs.
D. EA’s Unauthorized Use of Student Athletes’ Identities Injures Them
Courts look to the pecuniary loss of the plaintiff or the pecuniary gain of the defendant
resulting from the use to determine damages under right of publicity claims.116 In either case, for
a plaintiff to prove damages, the plaintiff needs to show that his or her identity has economic
value.117
The pecuniary loss to student athletes is difficult to ascertain because the amateurism
provision of the NCAA bylaws prevents student athletes from licensing their image in exchange
for compensation.118 This does not mean that the identities of student athletes do not have
commercial value, however. The NCAA bylaws regarding amateurism are nothing more than
guiding principles of an organization and do not trump state’s right of publicity laws.119
Ultimately, because student athletes are not compensated and the NCAA license to EA (even if
its terms were disclosed) does not include the transfer of student athlete identities, it is not
possible to determine definitively the pecuniary loss to the student athletes.
Conversely, it is not possible to determine, in absolute terms, the pecuniary gain to EA
resulting from the use of student athlete identities, but EA uses similar licensing structures in
other games. Those licensing agreements, therefore, may estimate the value of the student
athletes’ identities. For example, EA pays $35 million per year to license NFL players’ identities
for its Madden NFL games.120 Although this is not a perfect comparison, it provides a court a
relevant factor to consider in formulating damages. Moreover, a court could compare the
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profitability of EA’s NCAA football games before and after the virtual players became easily
identifiable with their real-life counterparts.
Because EA receives a pecuniary benefit from unauthorized use of student athletes’
identities, the student athletes can prove they have been injured by this use.
V. Crossroads―the First Amendment, Hart and the Right of Publicity
A. The First Amendment
In 2011, the Supreme Court of the United States found that a California statute that
prohibited the sale of violent video games to children was unconstitutional, and, in doing so, held
that video games are entitled to First Amendment protection. 121 The court found that video
games communicate ideas and social messages, like books, plays and movies that all receive
protection under the First Amendment, and, much like those traditionally protected media, use
literary devices to communicate those messages.122 When video games feature likenesses of real
people, First Amendment interests are placed at odds with publicity rights of the individual.
In cases where First Amendment rights clash with the right of publicity, courts must
weigh the effects of enforcing one right over the other.123 To do so, courts must balance the
importance of the right to free expression and the consequences of limiting that right against the
consequences associated with infringing on the right of publicity. 124 Courts have invoked a
variety of methods to assist in the balancing of First Amendment and publicity rights. The
methods used by the court in Hart included discussing commercial speech (which receives less
First Amendment protection), public interest, and transformative use. Each will be addressed in
turn in the following section.
B. Hart v. Electronic Arts: The Background
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Ryan Hart filed a putative class action suit against Electronic Arts on June 15, 2009, in
the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Somerset County, 125 which was later removed
to the United States District Court, District of New Jersey on November 24, 2009. 126 On
September 22, 2010, Hart’s first amended complaint was dismissed with prejudice on all counts,
save the right of publicity claim, which was dismissed without prejudice.127 Hart filed a new
complaint on October 12, 2010, asserting a more detailed claim for breach of his right of
publicity.128 In this complaint, Hart asserted that the EA violated his right of publicity based on
its use of his likeness in NCAA Football.129 The complaint alleged that a virtual player in NCAA
Football shared identical attributes to Hart130, as listed in the Rutgers University Football Media
Guide.131 The Media Guide stated that Hart came from Florida, was six feet, two inches tall,
weighed one hundred ninety-seven pounds, wore jersey number 13, wore a left wrist band, and
wore a helmet visor.132 Hart was the only quarterback at Rutgers University who hailed from
Florida.133 A virtual Rutgers quarterback was identical to Hart. The game stated that the virtual
quarterback came from Florida, was six feet, two inches tall, weighed one hundred ninety-seven
pounds, and wore jersey number 13, a left wrist band and a helmet visor. 134 Hart further alleged
that the 2006 edition of NCAA Football mirrored his actual playing statistics during the football
season.135
The court granted summary judgment in favor of Electronic Arts, holding that the
defendant’s First Amendment right to freedom of expression outweighed the plaintiff’s right of
publicity.136 Subsequently, on February 10, 2012, Hart appealed the ruling to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.137
C. Hart v. Electronic Arts: Analysis of Claims under the First Amendment
1. Commercial Speech Analysis
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Before discussing EA’s First Amendment defense, the court held that NCAA Football
was not commercial speech subject to less First Amendment protection.138 To reach this holding,
the court relied on Facenda v. N.F.L. Films, Inc.,139 which provides three factors to consider in
determining whether speech is commercial or noncommercial: 1.) whether the speech is an
advertisement; 2.) whether the speech refers to a specific product or service; and 3.) whether the
speaker has an economic motivation for the speech.140 Facenda instructs that “an affirmative
answer to all three questions provides ‘strong support’ for the conclusion that speech is
commercial.”141 The court applied the Facenda factors in analyzing Hart’s claim, and
determined that use of student athletes’ identities in the game could not be considered an
advertisement, because the student athlete identities were part of the game and could not be seen
until after the commercial transaction took place.142
2. Transformative Use Analysis
After determining that EA video games should not be considered commercial speech, the
court next considered whether the First Amendment granted EA the right to encroach on Hart’s
right of publicity.143
The Court evaluated Hart’s claims under two tests: the transformative use and the Rogers
test. 144 The Court’s analysis resulted in favoring EA under both tests. 145 As the Court also
concluded that the “transformative test best encapsulates the type of nuanced analysis required to
properly balance the competing right of publicity and First Amendment interests,”146 this paper
will focus on the court’s application of the transformative use test.
a. Transformative Use Test
The transformative use test has its roots in copyright law. 147 Copyright law grants a
limited monopoly to creators of a work fixed in a tangible medium of expression.148 However,
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this monopoly is tempered by the fair use doctrine, which allows others to use copyrighted work
for “criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching . . . , scholarship, or research.”149 The statute
provides factors to determine whether the use of a copyrighted work constitutes fair use,
including how much of the copyrighted work is used, whether the new work was created for a
commercial purpose, and whether the new work impacts the market for the copyrighted work.150
Proving a work is a fair use of a copyrighted work is a complete defense to copyright
infringement. 151 Courts have embraced the transformative use test to determine if use of a
copyrighted work is a fair use. 152 In cases involving copyright infringement claims, the
transformative use test inquires whether a new work has relied on the original work, or if the new
work transforms the original work by adding new expression, meaning or message.153
b. Transformative Use Test Applied to Video Game Cases
Recently, courts have been using the transformative use test to “reconcile tensions
between publicity rights and constitutionally protected free expression,”154 including in the Hart
case.

In determining that EA’s use of student athlete images in NCAA Football was

transformative, the court relied primarily on interpretation of, and comparisons to, two other
cases: Kirby v. Sega of America, Inc., 155 and No Doubt v. Activision, Inc. 156 These cases are
particularly applicable to Hart, as they are also right of publicity cases involving video game
avatars in which the transformative use test was applied.
In Kirby, singer Kierin Kirby sued Sega, alleging a character in Sega’s video game Space
Channel 5 was based on Kirby’s identity. Kirby claimed Ulala’s name was based on Kirby’s
catch phrase, ooh-la-la, and that Ulala’s clothing, facial features and hair color were all based on
Kirby. 157 Sega claimed Ulala was not based on Kirby, and that their game was therefore
protected under the First Amendment. 158

The California court of appeals applied the
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transformative use test and determined that, although Ulala shared some similarities with Kirby,
Sega introduced enough of its own creative elements to satisfy the transformative use test and
receive protection under the First Amendment 159 . Those creative elements included Ulala’s
clothing, which was merely similar to one of Kirby’s many costumes; Ulala’s hairstyle and
dance moves, both of which were dissimilar to Kirby’s; and the game itself, set in outer space
centuries into the future, which shared no similarity with Kirby’s style, video or photographs.160
In No Doubt, the band No Doubt sued Activision based on their right of publicity. 161 No
Doubt entered into a license agreement with Activision, in which No Doubt provided Activision
permission to use their likenesses to create avatars in the video game Band Hero.162 No Doubt
then sued, claiming that, though Activision had permission to use their images under the license
agreement, Activision’s use of the No Doubt avatars was outside the scope of the licensing
agreement and therefore violated their right of publicity. 163 Activision claimed its game was
protected expressive work under the First Amendment.164
Ruling in favor of No Doubt, the court determined that the video game was not
transformative.165 The court explained that the video game was not transformative because the
avatars were “painstakingly designed to mimic” the likenesses of the band members so that they
could “be” the rock stars,166 the avatars perform rock songs on stage, the activity by which No
Doubt is famous for,167 and the game doesn’t allow the player to change the appearance of the
avatars.168
c. Transformative Use Test Applied to Hart
The Hart court determined that EA included sufficient elements of its own expression in
NCAA Football to satisfy the requirements of the transformative use test. 169 The court in Hart,
however, misapplied the transformative use test, and therefore reached a faulty conclusion.
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Contrary to the opinion in Hart, NCAA Football’s use of the student athletes’ identities was not
transformative, and therefore was not entitled to First Amendment protection.
As in Kirby, the court looked beyond the virtual player to other elements of the game, and
found that there were “sufficient elements of EA’s own expression found in the game [to] justify
the conclusion that its use of Hart’s image is transformative,”170 including coaches, stadiums,
athletes, fans, commentary and more. 171 In Kirby, the court analyzed the setting of Space
Channel 5 not only to determine if it contained expressive elements, but to determine if those
expressive elements were a part of, or shared any similarity with, Kirby’s identity. 172 In NCAA
Football, the expressive elements the court listed as comprising the setting of the game―college
stadiums, coaches, fans―173 certainly are part of the identity of the student athletes. The student
athletes are known as college football players who compete at college stadiums with their
coaches and in front of fans. These elements are part of their identity. Accordingly, the Hart
court incorrectly determined that NCAA Football contained expressive elements beyond the
virtual players.174
The court’s reasoning in No Doubt further undercuts this portion of the Hart holding.
The court cited three points in determining that the use of the No Doubt avatars in Band Hero
was not transformative―the avatars were the literal likenesses of the band members, the avatars
performed the activity from which the band members achieved their fame, and the consumers
were unable to change the avatars’ appearance.175 In NCAA Football (and unchallenged by EA
in Hart),176 the virtual players are the literal likenesses of the student athletes.177 Beyond using
the literal images of student athletes to create the virtual players, EA also includes biographical
information, physical attributes and abilities of the student athletes.178 The virtual players also
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perform the activity from which the student athletes achieved their fame―playing college
football in a college stadium with their coaches and in front of fans.179
The court also found that Hart’s virtual image independently met transformative use.180
The court conceded that the virtual player looked like Hart and was designed with the same
physical attributes, physical abilities and biographical information as Hart,181 similar to the
avatars in No Doubt.182 The court then distinguished Hart from No Doubt, finding that, unlike
Band Hero, NCAA Football provides the ability to alter the virtual players’ images, physical
abilities and teammates.183 Relying on Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association, the court
found that Hart’s claim “fail[ed] to fully take into account the distinctive interactive nature of
video games.”184 “‘[L]ike protected books, video games communicate ideas . . . through many
familiar literary devices . . . and through features distinctive to the medium (such as the player’s
interaction with the virtual world).’ That suffices to confer EA protection . . . to deny First
Amendment protection because the game initially displays the virtual player in an unaltered form
would not give due accord to this expressive aspect of video games.”185 The court’s reliance on
this quote to support its point is simply misplaced. Although First Amendment protection, as
stated in Brown, does apply to video games, it does not do so blindly and at the expense of
publicity rights. Rather, those First Amendment protections must still be balanced with
copyright law and the right of publicity. Courts have determined that the transformative use test
is appropriate to evaluate both copyright infringement and right of publicity violation suits.186
The analysis provided in this paper has shown that NCAA Football, though generally protected
under the First Amendment, fails this test and therefore loses its First Amendment protection.
If the Hart analysis were accepted and applied to future cases, it would essentially begin
to erode of the right of publicity, at least within the world of video games. Using the court’s
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analysis, a commercial entity may use someone’s image without their permission and without
compensating them, as long as the new work transforms the image by adding sufficient creative
elements outside of the representation of the individual. The problem with this analysis is that it
provides an overly broad view on what satisfies transformation. Under the Hart standard, video
games such as EA’s Madden Football, which utilize the identity of real NFL players, would not
violate the identity of those players even if the game were set in a football stadium and depicted
virtual players playing football, as the real players do, so long as the game contains creative
elements such as the ability to modify a jersey color, or add a mustache to a player. Video games
like Band Hero would receive the same protection if consumers were able to modify the image
of the avatars.
This application of the transformative use test is dangerous, as it strips away a person’s
right of publicity in an entire form of media. Publicity rights, like copyright, patent, and
trademark rights, are an important form of intellectual property. To cultivate a publicity right
that has commercial value can take considerable money, time and energy. 187 By allowing video
game manufacturers to use another’s identity without compensation is to condone stealing
property from that individual, and providing consumers the ability to modify the identity in a
game does not change that- the stolen identity is still being used without compensation by the
video game manufacturer.
VI. Conclusion
EA violated the publicity rights of student athletes in NCAA Football when it used the
student athlete’s identities for their commercial advantage, without consent of, and resulting in
injury to, the student athletes.
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Video games are protected as creative works under the First Amendment, and this
protection can outweigh an individual’s right to publicity. First Amendment rights must be
balanced against the individual’s right to publicity to ensure neither right impermissibly
encroaches on the other. The transformative use test has been utilized in cases implicating both
right of publicity and First Amendment considerations. This test was applied in Hart, however,
the court’s interpretation of the test resulted in EA’s First Amendment rights swallowing the
publicity rights of the student athletes. The approach used in Hart was incorrect, and its
application to other similar cases will effectively erode the right of publicity as we know it, and
as Prosser elucidated it in Privacy. This problem was recognized by Hart’s attorney, Timothy J.
McIlwain, who remarked “this is arguably the most important case in America today because it
involves a citizen’s right to their persona and their image. There is nothing more sacred than
your own identity. Whether you’re an artist, an athlete or a celebrity, a corporation’s right as an
‘individual’ should not trump the rights of the real individual…there is just no way the framers
of the US constitution intended that.”188
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